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Abstract 
Migration dynamics from Turkey have considerably changed over the last 60 years, which has 
produced a vast diaspora of around 5 million people. The diaspora’s role in the early years of 
Turkish (labour) migration was characterized in economic terms (remittances and return 
migration), with the idea that the diaspora would contribute to the country’s economic 
development and welfare. By the time Turkey witnessed economic liberalization in the 1980s, 
and a transition from temporary migration to permanent settlement of its migrant citizens abroad, 
the diaspora’s obligations toward Turkey did not decline, but changed strategically in favour of 
the country’s political objectives. Turkey now sees its diaspora as a lobbying power both for 
internal and external relations of the country, and more specifically as its representatives in 
Europe legitimizing Turkey’s claim to EU citizenship. Accordingly, today the policies and 
Turkish institutions concerned with the diaspora focus not on financial engagement, but on the 
successful integration of the diaspora in the destination countries, which is expected to 
consequently benefit the country’s image and political claims.  
Keywords: Turkey, Diapora, Diaspora Engagement, Migration and Development 
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1. Introduction  
In the past, Turkey was a key emigration country for Europe, supplying countries like Germany 
and the Netherlands with a wealth of low skilled labour. The picture today has changed. The 
flow of migrants from (the middle income) Turkey to Europe has subsided, and there is now a 
large Turkish diaspora, particularly in Germany. Migration dynamics in/from Turkey have vastly 
changed over the last 60 years, which has produced a vast diaspora that could be engaged to a 
greater extent in Turkey. There are currently an estimated 3 million Turkish nationals living in 
the European Union (Hecker 2005), with a majority of these (2 million) residing in Germany. 
While other countries are doing their best to court their diaspora and see what their migrants 
abroad (or even second generation abroad) can contribute back home, Turkey has taken a 
different approach, and has a particularly different mindset with regard to their migrants abroad. 
The early years of Turkish migration policy were characterized in economic terms (remittances 
and return migration). Today, Turkey has a well established diaspora. The way Turkey now sees 
its diaspora is as citizens in Europe legitimizing Turkeys claim to EU citizenship. Through the 
analysis of policies and institutions that we make in this paper, we are able to see this change. 
We map the history of Turkish migration and policy shifts in migration and development 
and diaspora engagement. We then go on to outline the institutions and policies related to 
migration issues in Turkey and explain the debates on the role of the diaspora.  To better map 
how these institutions were initially developed, and are currently functioning and interacting, we 
have made in-depth interviews with policy makers, bureaucrats and academics. More 
specifically, we interviewed people from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security of the 
Republic of Turkey, External Relations and Services for Workers Abroad, the Ministry of State 
of Turkey, Turks Abroad and Relative Communities Department, a former Turkish attaché in the 
Netherlands, a political scientist and an expert on international relations and migration. In 
addition, a literature review and online analysis of the organization websites have been made to 
support the report. 
 
 
2. History and Geography of Emigration from Turkey  
2.1 Early years of the Turkish Republic 
The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 and in the early years of the Turkish 
republic, migration was used as a way of nation building (Hecker 2006). There were many waves 
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of forced migration as well as population exchanged between the Balkans and what in now 
Turkey with Muslim communities moving to Anatolia and Christian communities moving to the 
Balkans (Icduygu, Toktas and Soner 2008).  In the nation building process, non-Muslim 
communities were seen as a threat to the state and were driven out of Anatolia. There were 
official exchanges of population between Turkey and Greece with the Treaty of Lausanne, where 
an estimated 1.3 million Greeks were resettled and 400,000 to 500,000 Turks were resettled to 
Turkey (Hecker 2006). These population exchanges were made based on religion. Muslims were 
considered Turks and Christians Greek with the exception of the Greek-Orthodox community in 
Istanbul and the Muslim population in the Western Thrace (Kirisci 2000). Immigration of 
Muslims from the Balkans also continued.  When treaties were signed with their Balkan 
neighbours between 1925 and 1950, there was always a provision for migration (Hecker 2006). 
Until the 1950s, migration in Turkey was mainly characterized by the nation building process 
and the exchange of populations. The early years of migration are not seen as part of the modern 
immigration story of today. 
 
2.2 60s characterized by the “Guest Worker” programmes 
In the post WWII period, migration changed. Emigration from Turkey was seen as part of 
a migration strategy. The booming economies of many European countries after the recovery 
WWII, left countries like Germany, The Netherlands and France with labour shortages that were 
supplied by Turkey, Morocco and Southern Europe, while the rapidly growing population in 
Turkey looked to immigration as a way of reducing demographic and labour market pressure 
(Paine 1974; İçduygu 1991; Hecker 2006). Before any official labour agreements were signed, 
the labour market or Western Europe was already started to draw workers mainly through worker 
recruitment by firms and general job availability (İçduygu 2008a). The first official labour 
agreement was signed with Germany in 1961, and other agreements follow shortly behind with 
Austria, Belgium and The Netherlands in 1964, France in 1965, and Sweden and Australia in 
1967 (Hecker 2006; İçduygu 2008a). Other agreements were signed with the United Kingdom in 
1961, with Switzerland in 1971, with Denmark in 1973, and Norway in 1981 (Franz 1994). The 
outflow of workers reached its height in the 1970s and by the end of 1973, the Turkish 
Employment Services had sent more than 780,000 workers to Western Europe (80 percent of 
which were sent to Germany) (Hecker 2006). By 1974, labour recruitment had stopped due 
mainly to the oil crisis, and the economic downturn that resulted, but labour migrants in Europe 
were mainly granted permanent residence permits and the right to family reunification. 
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Originally “guest workers” from Turkey (and other countries) were meant to be 
temporary labour migration to specific countries in Europe, which changed with the economic 
downturn in the 1970s. It is important to note here that there was circularity in this guest worker 
migration also (which is often under reported). It was only when immigrants did not see a chance 
to come back to Europe, that migration became more permanent. This “guest worker” period of 
migration was characterized mainly by the emigration of low skilled rural population mainly for 
economic development (Penninx 1982). 
 
2.3 Diversification of emigration patterns from Turkey: Facts and figures 
Some of the “temporary” migration of the 60s and 70s turned into permanent migration. 
After the oil crisis in the 1970s, labour recruitment in Europe was halted, which spurred a new 
type of migration to these countries, namely family reunification and formation (Unver 2010). 
With recruitment to Western Europe halted and the economic and political situation in Turkey 
not ideal for returning, many labour migrants decided to stay in their new homes due mainly to 
low chances for readmission to Western Europe. Since many migrants had gained permanent 
residence and the right to family reunification in their new European homes, many began to send 
for their families in Turkey to join them, those characterizing the main wave of Turkish 
migration to Europe in the 80s and 90s (Hecker 2006). Women and children joined the mainly 
male workers changing the demographic makeup of migration from Turkey.  
There was also a diversification of migrants in the period between the 80s and 90s in 
other ways. Besides the increased migration through family reunification and family formation, 
there was also a flow of mainly Kurdish refugees and asylum seekers from the eastern provinces 
of Turkey (Hecker 2006). The 1980s saw military clashed between the Turkish security forces 
and the Partiya Kareren Kurdistan (PKK) in Turkey’s eastern, predominantly Kurdish, provinces 
(Hecker 2006). 
When the labour market of Western Europe was officially cut off to low-skilled Turks, 
other labour markets where sought out in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (İçduygu 
2008a). Now, low skilled migration turned more to the Middle East as new destinations for low 
skilled work opened up in the oil rich states (mainly Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait). From the 
early 1990s on, workers also started to move to neighbouring former communist countries like 
Russia and Ukraine (İçduygu 2008a). During this period, minority populations of Christians 
(Greek Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox), Jews and continued to move out of Turkey (Hecker 
2006). 
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Already in the 1980s, Turkey started to become not only an emigration country but also 
an immigration country (İçduygu 2008a), which will be discussed in more detail later. Since the 
1980s, there has also been increased migration of the highly skilled and student migration mainly 
to the United States, Canada and Australia (Akçapar 2009). 
 
Figure 1. Turkish Emigration by Destination 
 
Source: İçduygu A. (2006b), based on various official sources1 
 
2.4 Turkey: From a country of emigration to immigration 
Today, the face of migration in Turkey has changed. The new face of migration in 
Turkey is mainly comprised of asylum seekers, refugees, irregular labour migrants to Turkey and 
transit migrants on their way through Turkey to the EU (Kaya 2008b; İçduygu 2008b). Flows 
from Turkey have vastly decreased and now Turkey has become an immigration state. Besides 
the increased number of irregular labour migrants and transit migrants to Turkey, there has also 
been a growing number of non-European refugee and asylum seekers particularly from the 
Middle East and Gulf regions (Hecker, 2006). 
                                                            
1  International migration  data  in  Turkey  is  not  collected  by  a  single  organization.  As  in many  other  countries, 
migration data  in Turkey has  its  limitations.  In many cases, to map the overall migration  flows, one has to bring 
together  various  official  sources.  The  official  sources  from  which  international  migration  related  data  can  be 
extracted  in Turkey are  the  State  Statistics Organization, Ministry of  Labor and  Social  Security, and Ministry of 
Interior. In addition, censuses, border statistics, administrative records (residence permissions, work permissions, 
asylum  seeker  and  refugee  records,  citizenship  information,  visa  registers),  registers  of  other  countries  and 
extensive  surveys  (TURKSTAT, HUIPS, NIDI,  EUROSTAT,  TDHS)  provide  valuable  information  on migration  flows 
(Coskun and Turkyilmaz 2009). 
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Turkey currently has 4,402,914 abroad in mainly Germany, France, Netherlands, Austria, 
United States, Saudi Arabia, Bulgaria, Greece, Switzerland, United Kingdom (Ratha and Xu 
2008). At the same time, the stock of immigrants is 1,328,405, coming mainly from Bulgaria, 
Germany, Serbia and Montenegro, Greece, Macedonia FYR, Netherlands, Romania, Russia, 
United Kingdom, Azerbaijan (Ratha and Xu 2008). 
Today, generally, lower skilled Turks are found in Europe whereas the highly skilled (or 
elite) are found particularly in the United States and to a lesser extent in Canada. According to 
Köser-Akçapar (2006), since the 1980s, Turkish immigration to the United States has taken on 
many forms. This period has been characterized by increasing student migration, migration of 
professionals and some unskilled and semi-skilled labour. According to the US Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS), approximately 465,771 Turkish immigrants have come to the US 
between 1820 and 2004. According to the OECD’s estimates (İçduygu 2004), there were 
220,000 Turks in the US as of 2003. On the other hand, Turkish consular offices in Washington 
DC, New York City, Los Angeles, Houston and Chicago estimate that there are 350,000 Turkish 
Americans (Köser-Akçapar 2006). In short, today we are talking about a considerably big, 
dispersed Turkish diaspora with a diverse background. 
 
3.  Institutions and Policies Related to Migration Issues in Turkey  
Research on the role of origin country states in engaging and forming diaspora 
communities brings in two important debates in migration literature together: migration 
management and transnationalism from above. However, these debates have been dominated by 
the immigration country perspective, and have ignored the emigration country perspective in 
spite of its significance (Senay 2010). It is indeed quite new that researchers look at emigration 
management, and explore how emigration states engage with their nationals abroad (Gamlen 
2006). Moreover, the significant role that the emigration countries play in reproducing the 
transnational social field has only recently been recognized (Massey 1999). In this section, we 
aim to contribute to the debate with an emigration country perspective, and understand how 
Turkey currently deals with diaspora communities. 
Emigration occupies an important place in Turkey’s historical nation building, as well as 
its socio-economic development. Accordingly, there are quite a few institutions and 
organizations which deal with migration related issues in Turkey. Nevertheless, it is interesting 
to see that despite emigration’s significance for the country and the considerable number of 
citizens living abroad, there is no umbrella institution which deals with migration, but there are 
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various institutions which intervene in migration related issues according to their field of 
expertise. This fragmentation of institutions, and the lack of an overarching institution regarding 
migration make it difficult to have good coordination between different organizations.2 
Therefore, in the recent years new initiatives have been taken by politicians to overcome this 
problem. Accordingly, in the coming section we will portray not only the existing institutions, 
but also the newly established ones.  
 
3.1 Institutions 
 “The state shall take the necessary measures to ensure family unity, the education of the 
children, the cultural needs and the social security of Turkish nationals working abroad, and 
shall take the necessary measures to safeguard their ties with the home country, and to help them 
in their return home.” (Article 62 of the Turkish Constitution)   
 
3.1.A. Ministries  
As already mentioned, in Turkey the ministerial level agency regarding migration is 
fragmented. There are various ministries involved in migration related issues in Turkey. The 
major ministries are the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the Ministry of State, and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These ministries are involved not only in emigration processes, but 
also in how emigrants’ settlement in the destination countries takes place, and in their integration 
processes. These three ministries are concerned with the Turkish citizens living abroad at 
different levels.  
The general approach of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to manage and take a position 
concerning the integration processes of Turkish citizens living abroad. The ministry’s current 
focus regarding the Turkish diaspora living abroad is to assist them in overcoming integration 
problems with regard to political participation, education, employment and cultural 
maintenance.3 The Ministry of Labour and Social Security is mainly responsible for migrant 
workers living abroad and the social security agreements which protect their rights. The ministry 
has consultancy and attaché offices in 17 countries and 40 cities.4 The government office of 
Foreign Relations and Abroad Worker Services General Directorate (FRAWSGD) is linked to 
this ministry. The Ministry of State with the motto “wherever there is a citizen or descendent of 
                                                            
2 This argument is based on the common opinion of all the respondents interviewed for this report.  
3 See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the‐expatriate‐turkish‐citizens.en.mfa 
4 See the Ministry of Labor and Social Security website: http://www.csgb.gov.tr/csgbPortal/csgb.portal 
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ours, we are there”5 is the superior institution to the Turks Abroad and Relative Communities 
Department and the Consultancy Board for Citizens Living Abroad. The Directorate of Religious 
Affairs is also linked to the Office of Prime Minister, and is an influential actor in the Turkish 
context in engaging the migrants living abroad.6   
The ministries’ overall understanding of integration incorporates adapting to the 
destination country’s economic, social and political life while maintaining strong linkages with 
the origin country, the mother tongue and cultural heritage.7 According to the State’s discourse in 
general, Turkish migrants living abroad are highly encouraged to form their non-governmental 
organizations which could lead them to have a better public recognition, and communication 
with the residence country government. The official declarations indicate that a high level 
importance is given to dialogue with the migrants themselves, as well as the destination country 
institutions.8 For instance, in 2003, the Turkish Grand National Assembly constituted a 
commission to visit immigrant communities in Europe and investigate their problems (Kirisci 
2008). The parliament members with a migration background were influential for this initiative, 
and this report published by the commission is seen as an important product showing Turkey’s 
interest in its diaspora.9 
 
3.1. B Government centres / offices  
Dis Iliskiler ve Yurtdisi Isci Hizmetleri Genel Mudurlugu - Foreign Relations and Abroad 
Worker Services General Directorate (FRAWSGD) 
Foreign Relations and Abroad Worker Services General Directorate (FRAWSGD) is the 
first governmental organization (established in 1967) to deal with Turkish migrant workers 
abroad, with a special focus of those in Europe.10 FRAWSGD consists of two sections, the first 
one being the Department of Services for Citizens Abroad and the second one being the 
Department of International Relations. A deputy under secretary within the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security is the head of FRAWSGD, and responsible for counsellors and attachés 
abroad. At the same time, the Social Security Agency, which is linked to an undersecretary of the 
                                                            
5 “Nerede bir vatandasimiz, soydasimiz varsa, biz oradasyiz”: according to Faruk Celik, the minister of the State 
responsible of Turks living abroad and it is considered to be the motto of the ministry 
(http://www.devlet.gov.tr/Forms/cv.aspx). 
6 The organizations mentioned here will be discussed more in detail below. 
7 See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the‐expatriate‐turkish‐citizens.en.mfa 
8 Ibid. 
9 For further information on the report, see http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem22/yil01/ss335m.htm 
10 See the FRAWSGD website: http://www.csgb.gov.tr/csgbPortal/diyih.portal?page=genelmudurluk&id=2 
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Ministry of Labour and Social Security has played an important role in its establishment and has 
authority over the department (Kaya 2008a).  
 As its structure suggests, the organization has two main responsibilities. Firstly, it 
manages the international relations of the Ministry of Labour and Security, and secondly it is 
responsible for protecting and enhancing the rights and interests of Turkish citizens working 
abroad (Kaya 2008a). More specifically, at an institutional level, the organization coordinates the 
social security agreements signed between the Turkish and foreign governments. At an 
individual level, the directorate provides assistance to Turkish workers in the country of 
residence and upon their return to Turkey for problems they encounter (Article 10, Law no. 
3146, Official Gazette 09.01.1985). In particular, the directorate is in constant relation with the 
foreign counsellors and attachés responsible for the professional and social life of Turkish 
citizens living abroad.  
Looking at the services provided by FRAWSGD, we see that the directorate accepts 
written and oral complaints and suggestions, assists citizens with their payment and employment 
related problems, and informs the citizens on the policies and services of the Turkish 
government. More specifically, the Homeland-Advice Bureau (Yurt-Danis Burosu) was founded 
in 2001 within the constitution of FRAWSGD for Turkish citizens living permanently or 
temporarily abroad, or those who return permanently to Turkey and their families.11 This bureau 
provides direct services for the citizens who contact the bureau regarding their legal rights and 
obligations (İçduygu, 2008a). The staff of the bureau consists of multilingual employees who are 
also responsible of assisting the citizens with filling out forms and writing official letters in the 
residence country languages. 
In the definition of its tasks, the directorate especially emphasizes its loyalty to Turkey’s 
relationship with the European Union and the international judiciary. Within the frame of this 
perspective, the directorate states that it encourages the citizens and younger generations in 
professional education, supports employment opportunities and assists them with their legal 
issues.12  
 
Yurtdisi Turkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Baskanligi – Turks Abroad and Relative Communities 
Department 
                                                            
11 http://www.csgb.gov.tr/csgbPortal/diyih.portal?page=yurtdanis 
12 Ibid. 
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Recently, it has been recognized that the lack of an institution in charge of the Turkish 
diaspora may lead to coordination problems, and cause trouble in the decision making processes 
and the efficient assistance of the Turkish citizens living abroad.13 In line with this, a new law 
was approved in March 2010, for the formation of the organization entitled Turks Abroad and 
Relative Communities Department. The organization is linked to the Ministry of State, but works 
in coordination with other ministries and governmental organizations that are involved with 
Turks abroad. 
According to the first section of law number 5978 declaring the formation of the 
department, the main objective of the organization is to work with Turkish citizens living abroad 
and to help solve their problems.14 The second section of the law gives detailed information 
about the services and the activities of the department. The organization manages new social, 
cultural and economic activities with the Turkish citizens and descendents living abroad 
according to their needs and demands. It is mentioned that the activities of the organization are 
directed at not only Turkish citizens and descendents abroad, but also migrant organizations, 
non-governmental organizations abroad and professional organizations. In addition, it is 
worthwhile to mention that the department targets foreign students coming to study in Turkey as 
well, however the main focus is the Turkish diaspora. The sub-departments of the organization 
are as follows: Citizens Abroad (Yurtdisi vatandaslar), Cultural and Social Relations (Kulturel ve 
sosyal iliskiler), Institutional Relations and Communication (Kurumsal iliskiler ve iletisim), 
Foreign Students (Yabanci ogrenciler), Strategy Planning (Strateji gelistirme), Legal Advisory 
(Hukuk musavirligi), and Human Resources and Support Departments (Insan kaynaklari ve 
destek hizmetleri). 
The first permanent sub-department, Citizens Abroad, is responsible for coordinating and 
advising the activities regarding Turks abroad. Article 8 of law number 5978 indicates that it is 
this department which decides on how to engage the Turkish diaspora with the government and 
the obligations of the government towards its diaspora. This department’s constitution affirms 
that the importance of the Turkish diaspora in a globalized world. The interviewee from the 
Turks Abroad and Relative Communities Department argues, in addition, that Turkey is against 
an assimilationist perspective, and aims at helping the Turks abroad to maintain their social and 
cultural heritage. For this aim, the department works mainly with non-governmental migrant 
organizations.  
                                                            
13 This is stated by the interviewee from the Turks Abroad and Relative Communities Department.  
14For the details of law number 5978, see the website: http://www.yok.gov.tr/content/view/868/183/lang,tr/ 
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The Cultural and Social Relations Department is the second essential sub-department 
within the organization in terms of its approach towards Turks living abroad. According to the 
article 9 (law 5978), this department is in charge of relations with Turkish descendents living in 
Middle Asia, China, the Balkans, and the Middle East in cooperation with the Turkish 
International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA)15 which is the government’s 
development cooperation agency affiliated with the Ministry of the State.16 TIKA was formed 
initially to provide development assistance in various domains from economics to education to 
developing countries where Turkish is spoken and countries that border Turkey. Thus, although 
TIKA is not directly targeted toward Turkish migrant workers abroad, it takes part in the broader 
politics which are important for engaging the Turkish diaspora all over the world. With the 
Cultural and Social Relations department, a new division of tasks will be established to 
distinguish between those who make the policies and those who execute the projects for a better 
coordination and auditing.17  
The third permanent sub-department which is essential for understanding how the 
Turkish states engages with its diaspora abroad, is the Public Relations and Communication 
Department (Article 10, law no. 5978). This department is constituted based on the fact that there 
is no government based institutional organization which supports the activities of organizations 
that are founded and led by the Turkish citizens and descendents living abroad. As mentioned in 
the report of the Turks Abroad and Relative Communities Department, the non-governmental 
organizations are acknowledged as the forth power. Based on the same report, we can argue that 
from a governmental perspective, supporting the non-governmental Turkish organizations abroad 
positively affects the recognition of Turks living abroad, the resolution of their problems and 
demands. Moreover, it enhances their abilities and capabilities with regards to integration, and 
also creates the lobby and cooperation power for Turkey abroad. The department will in 
accordance, finance, coordinate and support projects which are related to these objectives of 
diaspora engagement. 
This new initiative brings together different parts of an overall all diaspora engagement 
policy in Turkey for the first time. Since the department has just been launched in the spring of 
2010, it is too early to evaluate the activities and added value of such an organization. 
                                                            
15 TIKA has coordination offices in 20 countries, and operates in many countries across Africa, Asia and Europe, 
delivering development assistance to partner countries through its projects and activities. 
16 For more information on TIKA: http://www.tika.gov.tr/ 
17 Mentioned in the report entitled “What does Turks Abroad and Relative Communities Department bring?”, given 
by the interviewee from the Turks Abroad and Relative Communities Department.  
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Nevertheless, it is of significance to follow up on this department for future, because it is the first 
over-arching governmental organization concerned with the Turkish diaspora. 
 
Yurtdisinda Yasayan Vatandaslar Danisma Kurulu - Consultancy Board for Citizens Living 
Abroad (CBCLA) 
Since its foundation in 1998, the main objective of CBCLA is to provide services to 
Turkish citizens living abroad concerning public related issues.18 The minister of the State is the 
president of this consultancy board. The main members of the board are one deputy chosen from 
each political party which is currently in the parliament, undersecretaries from the Ministry of 
Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and commissioners from the Department of 
Religious Affairs. In addition, 25 Turkish citizens living abroad are chosen as representatives of 
their community in the destination country.19 Currently the board has 76 members from 15 
different countries20.  
 In addition to the coordination and evaluation of measures taken regarding the Turkish 
citizens living abroad, the consultancy has several other tasks broadly defined as follows:21 1) if 
a certain ministry needs to debate on certain issues with the citizens living abroad, the 
consultancy boards coordinate this, 2) the board discusses and determines the concrete needs of 
migrants for their better economic and social integration in the destination countries as well as 
the services that should be provided by the Turkish government, 3) the board takes position 
against xenophobia, racism and discrimination, and brings public attention to specific events to 
create awareness, 4) if necessary, sub-committees are established for specific subjects, 5) overall 
the board is responsible for the information flow between the relevant organizations and the 
citizens living abroad.  
 With the foundation of Turks Abroad and Relative Communities Department, this 
consultancy board will act as a board responsible for contributing to determining the general 
strategy of how to engage and support the Turkish diaspora abroad.  
 
                                                            
18 See website: http://www.devlet.gov.tr/Forms/pYYVDK.aspx 
19  To  be  chosen  as  representative,  the  person  should  be  residing  in  the  destination  country with  a minimum 
duration of 5 years; speak the destination country very well; attained a minimum of secondary education; have 
work  permit  in  the  destination  country;  not  get  any  social  assistance;  not  have  any  crime  record;  have  good 
contacts with the community members in the destination country. 
20 The majority of members are from the United States (10) and Germany (35). Other members are from Australia, 
Canada, The Netherlands, Belgium, France,  the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, 
Norway and Finland. 
21 See website: http://www.devlet.gov.tr/Forms/pYYVDK.aspx 
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Tanıtma Fonu Kurulu Başbakanlık Merkez Teşkilatı - The Promotion Fund of the Office of the 
Turkish Prime Minister 
The promotion fund exists to finance projects aiming at promoting Turkey’s history, 
language, culture, art and geographical richness both in Turkey but also abroad. The board of the 
promotion fund was founded in 1985 within the Prime Ministry.22 The fund is open to migrant 
organizations whose activities can be of interest for the promotion of Turkey. The Turks Abroad 
and the Relative Communities Department states that some of the non-governmental 
organizations abroad are already sponsored by this fund for their activities, and it is argued that 
this support will only increase in the future.23  
 
Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi - The Directorate of Religious Affairs  
Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi (The Directorate of Religious Affairs) founded in March 1924 
and attached to the Office of the Prime Minister, is the Turkish national bureaucracy of religious 
affairs. In a way, Diyanet, regulated by the Turkish government, has the monopoly over religious 
activities, and is considered to be the representative of official Islam in Turkey (Avci 2005). In 
line with Turkey’s increasing engagement with its diaspora abroad, Diyanet’s scope of 
responsibility extended to abroad in the 1980s. This extension of Diyanet was initially guided by 
the religious affairs unit of the Turkish Embassies and the Religious Services Attachés of the 
Consulates (Avci 2005). Diyanet built its network and engaged with many religious migrant 
organizations (Ogelman 2003). As a result, today, it is considered to be the extension of the 
Turkish state abroad, and one of the most influential instruments in influencing and monitoring 
the Turkish diaspora (Citak 2010). It is essential to mention that Diyanet abroad works through 
the Turkish-Islamic Association of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri Turk-Islam Birligi - 
DITIB)24 or the Diyanet Foundations (Diyanet Vakıfları) (Citak 2010). DITIB is basically a 
Sunnite religious organization, which is related to the Turkish state with an agreement. Many 
Turkish Sunnite mosques are under its control abroad (Jonker 2000).  
In a way, this directorate has dominated the religious lives of immigrant communities in 
the previous years through several activities. However, it is important to mention that because 
Diyanet is the representative of official Islam in Turkey, it does not have the same distance to 
                                                            
22 See website: http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/pOrganizationDetail.aspx 
23 Mentioned in the report entitled “What does Turks Abroad and Relative Communities Department bring?”, given 
by the interviewee from the Turks Abroad and Relative Communities Department. 
24 For more information on DITIB:  
Özge Bilgili & Melissa Siegel  
 
Page 14 of 29 
 
other religious minorities like the Alevis or other alternative Islamic religious movements 
existing abroad (e.g. Milli Gorus, Suleymancis or Kaplancis).25 Regarding its activities more 
specifically, Diyanet sends religion officials with knowledge skills, operates the mosques, and 
works for the establishment of official religious education in the residence countries (Citak 
2010). Furthermore, other religious issues such as the construction of mosques, institutional 
arrangements for religious exercises (hajj, umre, kurban, and burial funds), religious feast 
celebrations and socio-cultural activities (e.g. Inter-faith dialogues) are of interest for Diyanet.  
The Diyanet board gets together every five years since the 1990s to decide on its agenda. 
These meetings give valuable information to better understand the State approach with regards to 
the religious domain, and what kind of role Diyanet plays for the integration of the Turkish 
migrants and their descendents abroad. In the Board Meeting in 2004, specific decisions about 
religion and the European Union nexus have been made.26 For instance, decision 3 states that the 
Diyanet is the institutional representative of the Turkish citizens living in the European Union. 
Moreover, the statements imply that Diyanet expands its purview beyond religion, and takes 
measures about social and cultural life more broadly. The Board Meeting decisions explicitly 
affirm that Diyanet should take active part in developing an education and culture policy for the 
Turkish citizens living abroad. Diyanet initiated several projects in cooperation with universities 
to train the imams to serve Turkish migrant communities abroad in the realms of local languages 
and culture of the residence country. In a way, Diyanet can be seen as the governmental 
organization responsible of maintaining the social and cultural sense of belonging of its citizens 
living abroad (Avci 2005).  
 
3.1.C. Official organizations 
As the migration history of Turkey suggests, Turkish descendents are found in many 
countries. Moreover, Turks living abroad have distinct backgrounds in terms of their ethnicity, 
socioeconomic status, as well as their cultural, political and religious affiliation. Given the size 
and diversity of the Turkish population abroad, there are hundreds of non-governmental 
(migrant) organizations abroad. These organizations show variation not only with regard to the 
characteristics of their members, but also concerning their objectives, activities and viewpoints 
about Turkey. It is beyond the scope of this study to map the differences between these 
                                                            
25 It is beyond the scope of this paper to further analyze these differences, however, it is important to mention that 
these differences exist, and there is a wide literature on this issue.  
26 See website: http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/dinsurasi/sura/default.asp 
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organizations however, the consultancy website of the Turkish government gives a 
comprehensive list of registered Turkish organizations abroad.27 The organizations are 
categorized as federations, cultural, female, professional, student, arts and sports organizations 
and organizations for parents and handicapped Turks.  
 
3.2 Policies  
3.2.A. Citizenship 
The concept of citizenship in Turkey is strongly linked to national identity. While, 
constitutionally, the citizenship relies on territory (jus soli), the concept of national identity relies 
heavily on the notion of common culture (Hecker 2006). The 1934 Law on Settlement (Law 
2510) gives persons of ‘Turkish decent and culture’ the right to enter the country for the purpose 
of permanent settlement and the right to Turkish citizenship. Being of Turkish descent and 
culture, however, are not the only ways to gain citizenship. Due to nation building and the 
integration of other groups, Turkish citizenship could be acquired on the basis of marriage, 
residence, birth and intention to settle permanently (Hecker 2006). Officially, the law does allow 
for dual citizenship in that automatic acquisition of a foreign nationality does not affect Turkish 
citizenship and Turkish law does not force citizens who were born with dual nationality to 
choose one when they reach the age of 18 (İçduygu 2008a). According to Turkish citizenship 
law, if a Turkish national would like to acquire the citizenship of another country, they must get 
a ‘permission document’ from the Ministry of the Interior and anyone who does acquire another 
nationality may request to keep their Turkish nationality or may give up their nationality 
(İçduygu , 2008a.) 
 
3.2.B. Rights and obligations of the Turkish diaspora towards Turkey 
Ordinary passports are issued to Turkish citizens who would like to work abroad and they 
are entitled to a note in their passport stating that they will work abroad making them (and their 
families) exempt from paying the ‘exit fee’ when leaving Turkey (İçduygu 2008a).  
Officially all Turkish citizens have the right to vote but no special arrangements have 
been made for migrant voting. The only possibility for residents of foreign countries to vote in 
national elections is to vote at national exit points 30 days prior to the election. It is then 
                                                            
27 http://www.konsolosluk.gov.tr/Organisations/Organisations_Main.aspx 
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understandable to only an estimated 5 percent of eligible voters abroad actually voted in the 2002 
elections (İçduygu 2008a). 
While Turkey does allow dual citizenship, it claims a predominant claim on those citizens 
who are residing in Turkey.  For example, those dual citizens residing in Turkey are subject to 
Turkish tax laws. Males over the age of 18 are also subject to compulsory military service. Dual 
nationals are also supposed to leave and enter Turkey on a Turkish passport (Kaya 2008b). 
 
3.2.C Rights and obligations of the Turkish diaspora concerning economic engagement 
One of the key ways in which government usually like to court or engage their diaspora is 
in economic affairs in the origin country. In the early days of migration, Turkey was no different 
in this respect. With time, however, Turkey’s focus on the diaspora has changed and less and less 
emphasis has been placed on the economic contributions migrants can and should make back 
home. 
From the beginning for the guest worker migration, Turks kept in close contact with 
family and friends in Turkey by mail and phone but also by sending remittances (İçduygu , 
2006a).  In the early days of labour migration, remittances were seen as an important source of 
development for the country and households receiving them. Particularly Turkish banks and the 
Central Bank have played a key role in remittance receipts to Turkey.  The Central Bank offers 
two specific bank accounts to migrants, making it attractive for them to send money back to 
Turkey and keep savings in accounts with the Central Bank. These two accounts are: (1) Foreign 
Currency Deposit Accounts and (2) Super FX Accounts (İçduygu 2006a). These accounts offer 
high interests rates than at other banks and were set up as a way to attract remittances and 
channel them into savings and investment in Turkey. Remittance deposits at the Central Bank 
reached €14 million in 2004. However, this way of attracting remittances to Turkey has been 
seen as a costly way of bringing in remittances, and is considered outside of the scope of the 
Central Bank making it an element that will be removed in the long-term (İçduygu 2006a).   
There are some new financial products being considered to be marketed to the diaspora 
abroad. One of the ideas is to sell special offer share of Turkish Airlines during privatisation. By 
and large, though, new financial products for migrants are being largely unexplored in the 
Turkish context and it is unclear what should be done with the previous €14 million attracted 
(İçduygu2006a). According to a presentation by the Turkish State Planning Organization, 
remittances have always helped in pay for imports of the country but have also always remained 
a small part of GDP (İçduygu 2006a).   
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Previously, in the 1970s and 80s, more emphasis was put on engaging the diaspora in 
economic activities and economic development in Turkey, but they mostly ended in failure due 
to corruption and mismanagement.  According to İçduygu (2006a), there was a clear plan in the 
1970s to channel remittances into ‘employment-generating’ activities to help maximize 
economic growth.  Three specific programmes were created: (1) worker’s joint stock companies, 
(2) Village Development Cooperatives and (3) the State Industry and Workers’ Investment Bank. 
Worker’s joint stock companies were created to channel money to less developed areas. It 
was believed that this would help create job opportunities in the less developed areas for return 
migrants and an economic outlet for their savings. More than 600 worker’s companies were 
created in an attempted to industrialise under developed regions. These companies ran into 
several problems from management to communication making their numbers dwindle to 20 or 30 
functioning companies that are themselves not well run. 
The Village Development Cooperatives were seen as another way to integrate return 
migrant savings into the local rural economy but many of them focused only on securing jobs for 
their members rather than making productive investments in the villages. They were mainly used 
as a way to facilitate more migration making it difficult to sustain the original goal of the project. 
Similarly, the State Industry and Workers’ Investment Bank was formed to facilitate mixed 
enterprises through both state and private funds (particularly remittances) but was also 
unsuccessful. 
İçduygu (2006a) goes on to explain that in the 50 year history or Turkish emigration, 
several policy measures, objectives and practices have been utilized to help enhance the 
developmental impact of remittances including: (1) enabling transfers via formal channels 
through foreign exchange accounts, premium interest rate accounts and remittance bonds; (2) 
giving to migrant collectives/associations through matched funding, public-private ventures and 
competitive bidding for development projects; (3) setting up special banks and (4) trying to 
secure future remittances by promoting future migration and engaging the diaspora.  
As illustrated in the figure below, remittances have drastically decreased in the last ten 
years. This decline has been partly attributed to the seeming lack of government interest in 
further securing remittance flows to Turkey (İçduygu 2006a).  At the moment, there are no 
governmental attempts to promote the flows of remittances to Turkey and their does not seem to 
be any likelihood of an uptake in the future (İçduygu 2006a). 
 
Figure 2. Remittances to Turkey 
Özge Bilgili & Melissa Siegel  
 
Page 18 of 29 
 
-
1.000
2.000
3.000
4.000
5.000
6.000
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08  
Source: World Bank 2009 
 
3.2.D Communication strategy regarding the European Union  
The communication strategy of the Turkish General Secretary of the European Union 
(attached to the Office of Prime Ministry) gives valuable information to better evaluate the 
Turkish government’s perspective regarding its diaspora living abroad. The communication 
strategy regarding the European Union is not necessarily about a governmental organization 
working for the diaspora. It is the strategy of the prime ministry. This, however, is important for 
influencing policy and future measures on migrants abroad.  
The following topics are found in the strategy report, and shows which subjects are 
prioritized by the government for policy making. The report’s 15th section refers to the 
cooperation with the Turkish community in the EU member states. Firstly, cooperation with the 
migrant organizations is mentioned. More specifically, the report suggests that migrant 
organizations should be listed, more contact should be established with the European city 
municipalities, and the Turkish migrant organizations should be made aware of the importance of 
EU integration. Secondly, the report gives importance to cooperation with Turkish origin 
individuals in the European country parliaments. Finally, the report aims at better relations with 
both the existing Turkish community and the new emigrants leaving for job opportunities in 
Europe. In this respect, especially information sharing and mutual understanding is put 
forward.28  
                                                            
28 See website for more information: http://www.abgs.gov.tr/abis/index.php?p=20&l=1 
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4. From Temporary to Permanent Migration: Evaluating the Role of Emigrants in Turkey  
Looking at Turkey’s history since its foundation in the early 1920s, one can argue that 
Turkey has strategically made use of immigration and emigration for different objectives. The 
different trends in emigration flows from Turkey reflect well the changes in the perception of the 
role of emigrants. The historical analysis of Turkish emigration provides a good basis to develop 
the debate on the role of emigrants in the eyes of the Turkish state, and how it has evolved in the 
last a few decades. What is interesting about the Turkish case is that the expectations from 
Turkish emigrants and their descendents who are born and raised in the residence countries, the 
so called second- and third-generation migrants, are not lessened just because they become 
permanent populations abroad. In other words, transition from temporary to permanent migration 
from Turkey has not caused a decline in the obligations of Turkish citizens living abroad, but a 
conceptual change in their role. In this section, we aim to discuss these changes with a historical 
perspective and evaluate the economic, political and socio-cultural role of Turkish diaspora for 
Turkey.  
 
4.1 The Role of diaspora regarding Turkish Economy 
4.1.A Turkish labour migration and economic development: From the 1960s till Today 
 In the 1950s, Turkey introduced a Five-Year Development Plan, which proposed that 
Turkey could ease the employment pressure on the labour market by exporting the surplus of 
labour power to the major European countries (Icduygu 2001; Unver 2010). This trend, initiated 
by the first bilateral agreements signed between Turkey and Germany in 1961, led to a huge 
inflow of less-skilled Turkish workers to several European countries. Till the 1973 Oil Crisis 
when emigration from Turkey to Europe faced a period of stagnation, Turkish migration policies 
regarding its citizens living abroad were dominated by “homeland policies” (Smith 1997) 
defined as an approach aiming at orienting migrants towards return, by creating institutions and 
taking measures facilitating migrants’ strong economic linkages with their origin country. In 
other words, Turkey introduced various measures to channel remittances in such a way that 
migrant earnings could positively affect the country’s economic development (see section 3).  
Using Gamlen’s (2006) words, we can say the diaspora engagement policies in Turkey 
were used to manage the scale of its economic manoeuvres. Compared to other forms of 
financing (eg. foreign aid and loans with high interest rates), remittances were seen as one of the 
efficient ways to solve Turkey’s economic problems, especially those regarding foreign debts 
and interest payments (Martin 1991). In a way, for a developing country going through economic 
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liberalization, the huge amount of remittances was seen to be an important revenue and source of 
hard currency (Icduygu 2008). With the inflow of hard currency, Turkey could import the inputs 
and the technology that are crucial for industrialization and international trade (Penninx 1982). 
Hence, Turkish citizens living abroad, especially those living within the EU, were expected to 
provide economic support through financial remittances, and investments back in Turkey.  
Looking at the numbers, we observe that migrant remittances were $93 million in 1967, 
and reached $1.4 billion in 1978 (Icduygu, 2006). Between 1979 and 1988, the level of annual 
remittances transferred to Turkey was around $1.5 – 2.0 billion, and in 1995, remittances 
increased to $3.4 billion (Icduygu, 2006). By this time Turkey witnessed economic liberalization 
and development. So, if we are to discuss the extent to which the diaspora money played a role in 
this, it is important to mention that it is difficult to talk about a causal relationship between 
diaspora’s economic engagement with Turkey and the country’s economic development. It is 
argued that the institutional (structural) and contextual circumstances in the country of origin are 
important factors that influence migrant remittances (De Haas 2005). In the case of Turkey as 
well, Sayan (2006) states that Turkish workers in Europe followed the economic and political 
actuality in Turkey, and adapted their remittances sending behaviour according to the origin 
country conditions. As a result of this, although one cannot deny the economic input of the 
Turkish diaspora in the early years of labour migration for the country’s economic development, 
it is of importance to bear in mind the ambiguous relationship between migration and 
development. 
Today, remittances make only around two per cent of the deficit whereas it was almost 
half of the trade deficit in the previous decades (Icduygu 2009). Consequently, we can argue that 
the relative size of remittances have declined over the years, and lost its significance at least in 
quantitative terms (Icduygu 2009). However, from a human development perspective, most of 
the studies have shown that migrant households are better off than the non-migrant households 
(eg. Bogazliyan 1976, Turkish International Migration Survey 1996). Hence, although from a 
State standpoint, the economic role of the Turkish diaspora might have decreased, on a 
household level, its significance continues to be persistent. 
 
4.1.B The Turkish diaspora and economic development: Mission accomplished or unfinished 
business? 
Currently, the debate on the economic role of the Turkish diaspora has changed 
considerably. Icduygu (2009) argues that the decline in the importance of remittances is mainly 
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due to the fact that Turkey has become a country which is well-integrated with the global 
economy. In parallel, the discourse on the importance of Turkish migrants living abroad for 
sending remittances has lost its priority. This idea is well stated by one of our interviewers from 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Security: “Before, it was very important that the migrants 
would send money back to Turkey, but now this has lost its importance. Remittances are equal to 
endorsement of a mid-sized company in Turkey.” Moreover, another interviewee from the 
Ministry of State affirms that “We do not see our migrants living abroad as “currency exchange 
point”, since Turkey is one of the biggest countries in the world. We have become the 17th 
biggest economy. Turkey is not a country which is in need of remittances to survive.”  
However, one could argue that remittances to Turkey could even increase due to better 
economic conditions in Turkey. Then, why does Turkey has changed its discourse about the 
economic contribution of the diaspora when their added value has not necessarily decreased?  
Firstly, some of the policies and programmes aimed at mobilizing migrant remittances in 
the past failed due to lack of coordination and corruption problems (Icduygu, 2009). These past 
experiences have decreased the likelihood of Turkey to depend on migrant remittances and 
investments. The following quote from the former attaché that we interviewed is exemplary to 
illustrate this point of view: “Turkey’s record on benefiting from remittances is not very positive. 
Many of the initiatives have failed in the past. It would be hard to mobilize people for similar 
projects.” Secondly, today the Turkish diaspora abroad is well established.  After the 1980s, 
there was a transition from temporary to permanent migration observed through family 
reunification and formation (Icduygu 2008). This is argued to decrease the likelihood of return 
and incentives for sending remittances. Thirdly, one can argue that the well established 
diaspora’s role towards Turkey has changed in essence, and diminished its economic relevance.  
It is interesting to look into these arguments more in detail, and debate if Turkey does not need 
remittances sent by the Turkish diaspora, or cannot mobilize its diaspora abroad to receive more 
remittances. Such questions are valuable to better understand the dynamics between the State and 
the diaspora, and to better evaluate the actual way of perceiving the Turkish diaspora in Turkey. 
 
4.2 Establishment of a Permanent Turkish diaspora Abroad:  Transition from Economic to 
Political Role of the diaspora 
4.2.A Turkey’s internal and external relations and the role of the diaspora 
Permanent settlement of the Turkish citizens in the destination countries led to changes in 
the way the Turkish State approached its citizens. While temporary migration implied return 
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migration, transition to permanent migration caused the establishment of a strong Turkish 
diaspora in the Western immigration countries (Icduygu 2008). In accordance with this change, 
the country’s expectations and its obligations towards its citizens permanently living abroad has 
changed. During this transition period, Turkish migrants begin to demand to express their socio-
cultural identities more explicitly, and they get mobilized politically through migrant 
organizations (Ogelman 2003). Another factor influencing this change is the new emigration 
flows of various groups abroad after the 1980s. The Turkish diaspora became much more 
heterogeneous when Turkey generated refugees and asylum seekers coming from politically 
active ethnic or religious minority groups in Turkey (Icduygu and Kirisci 2009). Finally, the 
Turkish economic liberalization which created new dynamics for Turkey became more 
prominent around this time. Given all these different factors, the focus on the role of Turkish 
emigrants changed drastically from economic to political.  
As the history of Turkish emigration suggests, the Turkish diaspora is not a homogeneous 
one, and the distance and attitude of the Turkish government towards the diaspora differs among 
groups. When interpreting Turkey’s attitude towards its diaspora, one should always consider 
this fact. There is an ongoing debate as to which groups’ demands are taken more seriously by 
the Turkish government than the others. The diversity among the Turkish diaspora, and their 
competing demands and varying links with the State is an interesting issue to focus more on, 
when discussing how the role of the diaspora is determined to be by the government. 
The Turkish State recently puts more emphasis on the lobbying power of the Turkish 
diaspora in Turkey. For instance, political parties refer to the Turkish diaspora for votes during 
the election times. Although Turkish citizens living abroad should return to Turkey to vote, 
which means that the institutional barriers towards full political participation are not eliminated, 
in the national discourse, there is emphasis on the power that the Turkish citizens living abroad 
have for Turkey (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003). Not only for internal relations, but also for external 
relations, the Turkish diaspora is an important actor and the Turkish state makes use of this. For 
instance, Turkey assigned academic positions abroad according to the scholars’ views on the 
massacres on Armenians in the beginning of the century (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003). In short, the 
Turkish diaspora is becoming a legitimate political actor that Turkey makes use of when 
necessary.  
 
4.2.B Global nation policies, the European Union and the Turkish diaspora 
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Global nation policies best define the Turkish state’s attitude towards its diaspora after 
the 1980s. According to these policies, states seek to encourage migrants to stay abroad but stay 
in touch (Smith 1997). One of the main agenda points for which it is essential that the migrants 
stay abroad but maintain their contact with Turkey is Turkey’s well-known plan to join the 
European Union. As Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003) would agree, we develop on the idea that Turkey 
legitimizes its presence in the European context through its diaspora in Europe. In spite of all the 
criticism that the Turkish descendents get about integration in the residence countries, Turkey 
puts the emphasis on the economic success, the upward social mobility and multicultural 
contribution of the Turkish citizens in Europe.29 
From the State perspective, the Turkish discourse implies that it is of great importance 
that the Turkish population in Europe integrates because, their successful integration is a proof of 
Turkey’s compatibility with Europe, and suggests that Turkey should be considered as an 
integral part of Europe. In accordance with this argument, we observe that Turkey’s diaspora 
engagement policies aim at supporting the well-being of Turkish migrants and their descendents. 
In other words, today Turkey sees the Turkish diaspora as the representatives of the Turkish 
nation abroad, although a considerable part of this population ever even lived in Turkey as the so 
called second- or third-generation migrants. We can conclude that Turkey supports the Turkish 
diaspora for them to be active actors in demanding to enhance their economic, social, cultural 
and legal rights in the residence countries. The institutional development that we have discussed 
in this article supports this view of the Turkish state with regards to its diaspora.  
 
4.3 The Turkish diaspora and the Brain Drain Debate 
 In this paper, we mentioned the highly skilled migration from Turkey to the major 
immigration countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia. As already stated, the 
migrant profile in these countries is quite different than that of Turkish diaspora in the European 
context, and their number is not too little to ignore.  However, the “brain drain” debate related to 
the highly skilled migration has not attracted a lot of attention after the 1960s in Turkey. The 
main reason for this was that the political and academic agenda was dominated by issues such as 
the labour migration to Europe, Turkey’s transition into an immigration country and integration 
processes (Akcapar 2006). One of the few initiatives to benefit from highly skilled migration in 
Turkey was the temporary return migration programme entitled TOKTEN (Transfer of 
                                                            
29 See website: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the‐expatriate‐turkish‐citizens.en.mfa 
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Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals)30, developed by the UNDP in 1977. The programme 
was piloted in Turkey, yet today it does not continue. 
 Especially after the economic crisis that Turkey faced at the beginning of the Millennium, 
highly skilled migration was represented as a socio-economic problem (Akcapar 2009). On a 
rhetorical level, highly skilled migrants’ potential contribution to Turkey’s development on 
economic and social level through transfer of knowledge and information, human capital 
formation and investment is acknowledged (Akcapar 2006). Nevertheless, not many concrete 
measures are taken to set the conditions for this potential to come about. The lack of investment 
in research and development is one of the key elements of this problem (Kaya 2003).  
From a developmental perspective, the efforts of highly skilled migrants to invest and 
transfer knowledge back to Turkey are limited to individual level, and dependent on specific 
cases (Kaya 2002). With regards to this issue, Unver (2010) observes an increasing level of 
reverse brain drain in Turkey. However, he puts the emphasis not on the convenient conditions 
that the Turkish state presents for the highly skilled citizens living abroad, but the inadequate 
living conditions abroad due to economic, but also social problems such as xenophobia and 
discrimination (Unver 2010). Icduygu (2009), in addition, refers to the establishment of private 
universities and competitive facilities which attract Turkish scholars, scientists, and university 
graduates living abroad, back to the country. In conclusion, highly skilled migrants, the so-called 
“crème de la crème” of Turkey symbolizes the part of the Turkish diaspora, which returns to 
Turkey only under the condition of adequate economic and social circumstances in Turkey. The 
respondent from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security suggests that Turkey should put 
more focus on this issue, and develop strategies which enhance human development 
opportunities. 
 
4.4 The Turkish diaspora Shapes the Social and Cultural Life in Turkey 
Debating on the role of diaspora, we cannot ignore how the Turkish diaspora which keeps 
its strong contact with Turkey, influences the social and cultural life in Turkey. In the current 
transnational context, the Turkish citizens living abroad have a strong impact on the economic, 
social and political spheres in Turkey. As Levitt (1999) explains, Turkish emigrants transfer not 
only money and goods, but also social remittances (knowledge, values, norms and ideas) to their 
country of origin. In particular, the existing ties between Turkey and the destination countries 
                                                            
30 See website for more information on the programme: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/migmain.showPractice?p_lang=en&p_practice_id=26 
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have led to new types of clothing and food consumption, and emergence of new diaspora-based 
art and music (Soysal, 2009). Moreover, civil society activities bring together the actors of the 
diaspora with the non-migrant Turkish citizens (Icduygu 2009). Accordingly, we can argue that 
although family and friends of the migrants in Turkey help migrants to maintain their social and 
cultural heritage, it is obvious that the Turkish migrants abroad also transfer values, ideas and 
knowledge to their community, and hence have an impact on the social and cultural life in 
Turkey.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 From the early years of emigration till today, Turkey has witnessed considerable changes 
both in socioeconomic and political domains. In accordance with these changes, the country’s 
style of dealing with its citizens living abroad has evolved. In this paper, firstly, we described in 
detail institutional level arrangements that Turkey has made in order to better engage its diaspora 
over the years. Secondly, we discussed how these policies and practices have led to different 
debates regarding the role of the Turkish diaspora for Turkey.  
We have seen that the diaspora’s role in the 1960s was mainly to contribute to the 
country’s economic development and welfare. By the time Turkey witnessed economic 
liberalization, as the political scientist that we have interviewed suggests “The voice of Turkey 
began to be stronger because today it is more powerful in economic terms and have better 
international contacts. Naturally, the country’s dialogue with its diaspora has changed”. The 
analysis that we have made illustrated in which way this change has been realized. Today, for 
Turkey, the Turkish diaspora is a lobbying power both for internal and external relations of the 
country. In particular, as the former attaché in the Netherlands affirms “today Turks living 
abroad are obviously of great importance for Turkey’s future about the European Union”. In 
short, in political terms, permanent settlement of Turks abroad is seen as an important strategic 
advantage. We also touched upon the effect of the diaspora on the social and cultural life in 
Turkey. Finally, “the brain drain” debate was mentioned as highly skilled migrants account for a 
particular group of the diaspora. To conclude, with this paper, we have seen the diversity of the 
Turkish diaspora’s role and agency, and how the politics and practices of transnational 
citizenship have an influence on Turkey’s history and future.  
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Appendix 
List of Useful Websites for Further Information 
Consular Services Website Website, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey: 
http://www.konsolosluk.gov.tr/Organisations/Organisations_Main.aspx 
The Council of Higher Education, Turkey: http://www.yok.gov.tr/content/view/868/183/lang,tr/ 
The Department of Religious Affairs, Turkey Website: 
http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/dinsurasi/sura/default.asp 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-expatriate-turkish-
citizens.en.mfa 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey Website, Information on Turks abroad: 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-expatriate-turkish-citizens.en.mfa 
The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Turkey, FRAWSGD website: 
http://www.csgb.gov.tr/csgbPortal/diyih.portal?page=genelmudurluk&id=2 
The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Turkey Website, Information on Homeland-Advice 
Bureau:  http://www.csgb.gov.tr/csgbPortal/diyih.portal?page=yurtdanis 
The Ministry of State, Turkey Website:  http://www.devlet.gov.tr/Forms/pYYVDK.aspx 
The Office of Prime Ministry, The General Secretary of the European Union, Turkey Website: 
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/abis/index.php?p=20&l=1 
The Office of Prime Ministry, Turkey Website: 
http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/pOrganizationDetail.aspx 
Turkish Grand National Assembly Website, Commission Report on the Problems of Turks 
Living Abroad:  http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem22/yil01/ss335m.htm 
Turkish-Islamic Association of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri Turk-Islam Birligi – DITIB) 
website: http://www.ditib.de/index.php?lang=en 
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